Covid and Gramsci

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), was the head of the parliamentary communist group in Italy at the time of his arrest by Mussolini’s facist regime in 1926. Sentenced in 1928, Mussolini is reported as saying at his trial, ‘we must stop this brain working for twenty years’. He failed to do so, and despite his failing health and conditions of strict censorship, Gramsci set about committing his thoughts to paper in a series of ‘Prison Notebooks’ which were eventually smuggled out just before his death in 1937. The content of the Prison Notebooks cover a huge range of topics and the nature of their composition has made their interpretation both difficult and contested, but the ideas encoded in them have had a profound influence on Western Marxism, post-Marxism, post colonial studies, cultural studies and understandings of international political economy. Steve Jones (Routledge Critical Thinkers series : Antonio Gramsci), describes the Prison Notebooks as ‘among the most important and moving documents of the twentieth century’ and justifies this statement by arguing ‘the very different scraps of synthesis and analysis in the Notebooks – about intellectuals, language and linguistics, about literature and folklore, the Southern Question and the Risorgimento, about ‘Americanism’, ‘Fordism’ and most insistently hegemony – build towards a major understanding of power and meaning in the countries of advanced capitalism.’ The relevance of Gramsci’s thought to the conditions of the current pandemic lie in his conception of ‘hegemony’ and his argument that power is maintained not merely by coercion but also by consent. This consent, (to crudely summarise Gramsci’s conception), is in a constant state of negotiation between different actors in both the state and civil society and in the wider sphere of culture, where notions of ‘common sense’ are an important battleground. Hegemonic power is, in Gramsci’s thought, capable of challenge, which, at times of crisis, opens up the possibility of a ‘hegemonic shift’ where different values and different conceptions of common sense may supplant the existing consensus. Has Covid-19 created conditions that are likely to lead to such a hegemonic shift? To what degree have notions of ‘common sense’ been challenged? Has the pandemic led to an end of the neoliberal hegemony? What, if any, is the role of ‘organic intellectuals’?

On the 11th of March 2021, the Pandemic Perspectives group debated these issues, led by Jakub Benes (lecturer in Central European history at UCL). The group were afforded a grounding in Gramsci’s thought by Stuart Hall’s ‘The Neo-Liberal Revolution‘ from 2011, Sujeong Kim’s ‘Hegemony and Cultural Resistance’ 2015. More in-depth accounts by Sperber and Hoare, ‘An Introduction to Antonio Gramsci: His life, thought and legacy’ and Steve Jones, ‘Routledge Critical Thinkers – Antonio Gramsci’ were recommended as further reading. Contemporary uses of Gramsci’s thought in relation to the pandemic were also suggested, Zackary Levinson’s ‘Covid-19: An Organic Crisis is upon us – when Gramsci goes Viral‘; Kamran Baradanan’s ‘Ground Zero or why do we need Antonio Gramsci in the Times of Covid-19‘;  Murji and Picker’s ‘Racist morbidities: A Conjunctural analysis of the Covid-19 Pandemic‘; Dr Colin Alexander’s use of Gramscian notions of ‘common sense’ and what he terms ‘vaccine propaganda’ and ‘the commoner’s’ view on Marcus Rashford as an ‘organic intellectual‘.

Dr Benes opened the discussion by introducing Gramsci as a useful thinker about politics, power and crisis. He noted that, as a mid-twentieth century Italian communist leader, it was possible that the group could question the relevance of Gramsci’s thought to the contemporary context. He also pointed out that Gramsci’s achievement in developing a Marxist theory of politics (largely neglected by Marx himself), was always purposeful in intent – the analysis of the means by which the ruling class held on to power being, (in Gramsci’s frame of reference), a necessary precursor to ensure the success of the proletarian revolution. He also noted that although Gramsci’s key insight was that the consent of the oppressed classes was a key component in the maintenance of power, he did not give it predominance over the coercive elements of control employed by the ruling class. Outlining the concept of hegemony, he noted its origins in ancient Greece and its use by Lenin in a much more limited form in the creation of a ‘historic bloc’ of workers and peasants during the Russian revolution. He explained the importance of conceptions of ‘common sense’ in understanding Gramsci. Noting that unlike many Marxists who denigrated and dismissed the views of the common folk as ‘false consciousness’, Gramsci believed that elements of ‘good sense’ within popular thought needed to be understood and built upon in order to ensure consent and therefore support for revolutionary change.

He proposed framing the debate in terms of the potential for hegemonic change brought about by the Covid-19 crisis. He noted that in Stuart Hall’s analysis, the 2008 crash had not fundamentally challenged the neoliberal consensus, merely diverting dissent into rising xenophobia and populism, and raised the questioned of whether the pandemic constituted any greater a challenge. To clarify, he characterised ‘neoliberalism’ as a belief in an unregulated globalised capitalism, where the forces of the market would provide the best outcome if unconstrained by state interference, and society was characterised by the antinomian individual consumer. He argued that whilst such a neoliberalism was not completely hegemonic, it had achieved near total dominance in the USA and Britain and had made major inroads into states which had historically afforded a greater role to the state. He expressed scepticism as to whether the pandemic had yet profoundly challenged this hegemony, asserting that there was plentiful evidence that neoliberalism was ‘still alive and kicking’.

David Christie suggested that the pandemic had led to a reconfiguring of ‘common sense’ beliefs about the role of the state. During the pandemic, he argued, the belief that the market was the only arbiter of well-being had evaporated, and that in the crisis people had returned to an acceptance of a greatly enhanced role for the state, as witnessed by furlough schemes, subsidies to businesses and the return of state investment in industry. He argued that the return to an enhanced role for the state was a global phenomena and would not disappear once the immediate crisis had passed. Christopher Griffin questioned this analysis, arguing that the retreat of the state in the 1980s had been more rhetorical than real under Thatcherism, and that the pandemic itself had opened up further opportunities for private companies to profit resulting in the transfer of billions to private enterprises with very little oversight. Dr Benes too doubted the depth of this ‘rediscovery of the state’, although he noted the sight of a Conservative administration standing behind banners proclaiming ‘Protect the NHS’ was perhaps surprising, he doubted the sincerity or longevity of this change of heart. He also argued that the the elevation of the free market as the provider of freedom and prosperity remained unchallenged under the pandemic, noting that new markets had opened up, the gig economy had been accelerated and that the seizing of opportunities afforded by the crisis by ‘smart people with smart ideas’ was both widely praised and viewed as a route out of the current problems. Sadegh Attari was equally sceptical, quoting Johnson from Prime Minister’s question time lambasting Kier Starmer’s pre-pandemic criticism of Big Pharma, by declaring ‘these are the people who saved you!’. Richard Kendall reminded the group that ostensible support for state welfare provision by the Conservative party was not new, being employed by the Cameron administration while cutting NHS funding, and suggested that Johnson’s support was no more sincere.

Griffin, arguing more broadly, doubted our ability to ascertain shifts in broadly held beliefs, noting the echo-chamber of social media that had left left-wing supporters of Jeremy Corbyn anticipating an electoral victory in 2019 rather than the rout that ensued. New member Freya Field-Donovan, referencing her work on housing estates in South London, noted that the most obvious shift in sensibilities there was the growth in belief in conspiracy theories such as QAnon, arguing that those who felt left behind by the ongoing punitive destruction of working class life had retreated into a ‘fantasy space’ where malign forces beyond their control were pulling the strings. She noted these views were common amongst those who worked in institutions of the state such as social workers, describing it as a ‘strange rupture’. Carmen Torres, reporting from an American perspective, noted too how rapidly conspiracy theories had taken off in the USA, describing them as being ‘weaponised’ by the Trump administration. Dr Benes suggested that the rediscovery of the importance of the state may also have led to a radicalisation of mistrust of state power, and echoed Griffin’s point that the degree of fragmentation of views may be greater than we imagine making it difficult to determine the direction of any shift in belief-systems. David Christie took the moment to quote Gramsci, noting that his comment that, ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’, seemed very apt at this point. Liam Knight linked these ideas to his study of post-truth, noting the loss of faith in experts that preceded the pandemic had been accelerated as they had failed to either predict and control the disease. Kendall disagreed, arguing that there had been a reversion to blind faith in expertise, at least in its scientific form, and governance by those ‘who know better’. Dr Benes noted the neoliberalism was grounded in the role of experts, in the assumption that politics have no place and that a dispassionate technocratic rule that abided by the rules of the market was the only viable option. He suggested that conspiracy theories and their exploitation by unscrupulous politicians did indeed conform to Gramscian notions of ‘morbid symptoms’, but noted that they also constituted, albeit perverse, resistance and rejection of neoliberal hegemonic values.

Knight poured yet more cold water over any notions of any form of hegemonic shift taking place, at least in Britain, noting that support for the Conservative party (in voting intentions) had risen 4% in the last week. Field-Donovan concurred, arguing that without Scotland, it was impossible for the Labour party to gain power, and that real politics in the UK would be played out within the Conservative party, in what amounted to a one-party state. Christie argued that this did not necessarily mean that profound change was not occurring under Covid. He argued that British Conservatism had no clear ideology, proving itself as primarily an election-winning machine that had continuously adapted its programme to concur with public views of common sense, citing the acceptance of the welfare state and post-war consensus politics as evidence for his claim. He also argued that the neoliberal consensus of minimal government and the free market had been undermined more broadly by the pandemic, and no longer held the unequivocal backing of institutions such as the Work Bank, IMF and ECB, nor the support of journals such as the Financial Times or the Economist. All these organs, he argued, were now advocates for massive state intervention, which would make it unlikely that the British Conservative party would not follow suit. He received some support in this view from Griffin, who noted that the metaphor of the ‘household budget’, so liberally used by the Thatcher administration to describe government finance, had gone out of fashion, and there was less talk of ‘balancing the books’. The Bank of England, he pointed out, was now a generous provider of funds rather than a controller of the money supply, and global central banks were collectively taking advantage of minimal interest rates to borrow money on a huge scale. He noted that many aspects of the current conservative programme were watered down versions of Labour’s manifesto, including ideas such as the new Investment Bank that had been developed under Ed Miliband. He noted that Conservatism too, was alive to Gramscian notions, quoting Andrew Breitbart’s view that ‘politics is always downstream from culture’. Dr Benes noted that the nature of Gramsci’s work made it deeply malleable, and it had been appropriated by elements of the right, but felt obliged to restate Gramsci’s Marxist origins and his belief in a fundamentally conflicted society made up of classes, which is anti-ethical to conservative beliefs.

Alice Seville (co-founder of PGR Feminisms) outlined her shift of thinking through the duration of the pandemic. She noted the ideas expressed early in lockdown by figures such as David Lynch and Simon Armitage, who had argued that the forced rupture in normal life would give us a chance to ‘commune with ourselves’, think through our unconsciously held assumptions, and ‘come out wiser’. Although she considered their views to be narrowly class-bound and found Lynch’s cryptic apoliticism antagonising, she also noted the concept of ‘cognitive estrangement’, associated in literature with the reading of science fiction, by which the reader is distanced from everyday experience and gains a sense of new, broader, perspective. The Pandemic, she suggested, had been a massively estranging experience, and gave hope that it might have engendered something akin to a Gramscian notion of hegemonic shift. However, seeing how the deleterious effects of the pandemic had been accented so heavily on the working class, she said that these hopes now seemed confined to the comfortable middle-classes who had escaped the worst effects of the pandemic. Christie was almost alone in supporting Seville’s earlier optimism, arguing that although the tangible consequences had yet to manifest, he did believe that the pandemic had given people an opportunity to question the course of their lives, re-evaluate their relationships with their families, their attitudes to work and question, and for the first time, begin to think what a better future could actually be like.

Kendall pointed out that the debate so far had focussed too much on defining politics through politicians and the political process, and argued that the biggest changes in notions of common sense in the last year had been developed outside of the conventional political realm, in the Black Lives Matter movement. Christie concurred, arguing that what he thought was most powerful in Gramsci was the conception of hegemony not being delivered from the top down, but emerging from struggles outside the power elite in civil society, and being driven by the role of ‘organic intellectuals’. He cited the actions of BLM, Extension Rebellion and the MeToo movement as evidence of significant shifts and the roles of Marcus Rashford and David Attenborough as having enormous influence. Knight broadly agreed, suggesting that the increased valuation of frontline workers during lockdown indicated something akin to a hegemonic shift that had emerged spontaneously from members of the public. Dr Benes was quick to caution the liberal use of the term ‘organic intellectuals’, noting that Gramsci envisaged them as being proletarian activists, a description that could not easily be applied to David Attenborough, and was a stretch for a highly-paid professional footballer. He also noted that whilst BLM and Extinction Rebellion were exciting movements that challenged power structures in various ways, he was unsure that they were genuinely counter-hegemonic, noting their marketisation and their capacity for adoption by left political parties without fundamentally challenging the existing political economy. Gah-Kai Leung was even more sceptical. He argued that any such shifts in perspective had been superficial, that actions such as the ‘clap for carers’ had been merely virtue-signalling rather than indicative of a real change in outlook, and that without capturing the institutions no substantive change would occur. Christie noted Gramsci’s view that whist what he called the ‘war of movement’ (the seizure of state power) was ultimately necessary to bring about change, the ‘war of manoeuvre’, (the gaining of the consent of a broad ‘historic bloc’) was both a necessary precursor and required to maintain the gains of any revolution. Leung was highly doubtful, arguing that it was only when ‘structure meets agency’ that change occurs and cited the entrenched power of the legal system in supporting the status quo. Griffin was more hopeful, noting Kehinde Andrews narrative of decolonisation, emphasising the decolonising of one’s mind as potentially more important than envisaging the storming of the barricades. He noted the power for change inherent in the creation of autonomous spaces in the 1960s, where alternative ways of living could become lived practice, potentially seeding radical future change. Dr Benes was sceptical about the efficacy of such movements, noting the failure of the Capital Hill Autonomous Zone in Seattle as evidence of the problem of engaging support from the wider population beyond the activists involved in the occupation.

There was so much more…. to have your say join Pandemic Perspectives (contact DCC841@student.bham.ac.uk) or set up your own group…