Covid and the Global South

While the course of the pandemic in Europe and America has been afforded blanket coverage, its potentially far greater impact on the Global South has received far less attention. Yet in the number of cases recorded, India, Brazil, Columbia, Peru, Mexico and South Africa are all in the top ten, Brazil and India have the second and third highest numbers of deaths, and six south or central American states are in the top ten of rates of infection per million of population, with Peru at the top of the list. (Data from Worldomoters) As under-reporting is probable, the true effects are likely to be much worse. Given that the majority of these states entered the crisis with patchy or inadequate health services it seems likely that the greatest suffering will be served on the peoples of the developing world. Health Services in Peru and Ecuador, for example, were quickly overwhelmed leading to horrific scenes played out in the streets of their major cities. In states with weak or non-existent welfare systems, and with much employment in the informal sector, lockdowns to contain the spread of the disease are impossible or unwise, as the disastrous handling of the crisis by the Modi’s BJP in India demonstrates. Whilst well-ordered (if authoritarian) states such as Rwanda have efficiently conducted lockdowns, chaotic, even negligent, responses by the leaders of Brazil, Mexico and Tanzania have compounded the problem of dealing with the disease in their countries. Perhaps more serious still, the ongoing economic consequences of the pandemic has fallen on states in the Global South with already unsustainably high levels of debt, and on export-led economies which will be severely affected by the downturn in global trade. Furthermore, the lack of international cooperation to address the disease, that has been such a depressing feature of the response to pandemic, means that the chances of international agreement on vital debt-relief for the poorest and most indebted states seems highly unlikely.

On October 8th the Pandemic Perspectives group discussed these issues, guided by an Economist article ‘Measuring the Poverty Pandemic’ from July; Debapriya Bhattacharya’s OECD article ‘Covid-19 a Game Changer for the Global South and International Co-operation?‘; Larry’ Elliot’s 4th October Guardian piece, ‘Creditors must wake up fast to Threat of the Emerging Market Debt Crisis‘; Linda Nordling’s Science article ‘The Pandemic appears to have spared Africa so far, Scientists are Struggling to Understand why‘; and Gordon Dougan’s piece in The Conversation, ‘Is Manaus, Brazil, The First City to reach Herd Immunity?’. During the debate reference was made to a Nature article ‘The major genetic risk factor for severe Covid-19 is inherited from Neanderthals’ and to Samuel Lovett’s Independent piece ‘Coronavirus: Global Vaccine Project Criticised for asking Poorest Nations to share ‘Burden’ of Costs’.

David Christie opened the debate with an attempt to present a less apocalyptic outcome for the Global South than much of the evidence would seem to warrant. He suggested that as the demographic make-up of the Global South was much younger than in the developed world, and, as the young seemed to be largely immune, countries might be spared the highest death tolls. In addition, he referred to the Science article that suggested the surprisingly low figures for sub-saharan Africa might be a consequence of an inherent genetic resistance. In response, Sadegh Attari introduced the Nature article suggesting that the action of residual Neanderthal genes may be responsible for severe Covid responses, which, if so, would imply covid would have a greater impact in those of European origin. Richard Kendall challenged the assumption that those under 40 were largely immune to the disease, arguing that this may only apply to the affluent world, and, like diseases such as TB, immunity may not occur in those already malnourished or suffering from other health impairments.

David also argued, that whilst the immediate consequences of inadequate health provision and the barriers to effective lockdowns in poorer nations would enact a terrible toll initially, the very impossibility of shut-downs would mean that ‘herd immunity’ would arise more quickly and therefore the internal and regional economies in the Global South would be less affected. The Manaus article was cited. Ronan Love was highly sceptical of such claims. He noted that given the inevitable shrinkage of the global economy, its profoundly deleterious effect would fall heaviest on already vulnerable economies in the developing world. He posited that the key issue would be the worsening levels of indebtedness, rendering states unable to provide even basic services. Noting that 90 countries had already applied for loans from the IMF, and the parlous state of Nigerian, Ghanaian and Angolan economies, (already employing 40% of government revenues to service existing debt), he argued that the lack of access to dollar swap lines facilitated by the international banking system would cripple developing world economies, and short of a concerted international effort for debt-relief the consequences would be catastrophic. He did not see such an international effort likely, although he did note the huge loans recently granted by the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as perhaps a small silver-lining in a gloomy prognosis.

Hanan Fara noted that even the end of the crisis, with the development of a workable vaccine, would likely lead to its distribution among the richer nations long before it was accessible to the peoples of the Global South. She commented on the actions of both China and the USA in regard to COVAX, where both states were boycotting the body due to their mutual antipathy, thereby undermining any international co-operation in pursuit of a vaccine. The nationalistic nature of the ‘race for a vaccine’ was noted and it was suggested that the first nation to successfully develop a vaccine would likely be an advanced economy, which would inevitably prioritise its own population and strategic allies first, further limiting access in the developing world. Ronan postulated an analogy to the actions of the USSR and the USA during the cold war, with China and the USA using vaccine distribution as a tool to further strategic geopolitical aims in the way that arms and aid were employed in the previous struggle for global hegemony. David, clinging to hope, suggested that, if such a competition occurred it might aid the Global South, although, in all likelihood with severe strings attached. Hanan noted that it was important to remember that not only state actors would be involved, and that multi-national corporations, would likely control production and distribution in accordance with their own, commercial, imperatives. Richard noted that a vaccine itself was not a ‘silver bullet’, that other crises were likely to follow, and that the group should be wary of a ‘Western Saviourism’ interpretation of history.

Sadegh noted that the pandemic was occurring at a time of increasing ‘isolation’, where states were pursuing protectionist trade policies, and retreating into nationalistic concerns. He noted Brexit, and the consequences the Conservative governments decision to fold the Ministry of Overseas Development into the foreign office, as typical of a retreat from international co-operation to the detriment of the developing world. Helen noted the relatively invisibility of covid’s global dimension, and the increasing parochialism of the coverage in Britain. The implications of attempts to achieve autarky were debated. David argued that globalisation had not been an unmitigated good, and in the case of sub-Saharan Africa had resulted in economies entirely orientated to service the needs of the West. This, he argued had left many nations dependent entirely on the extraction and export of primary materials to the neglect of the needs of their own people and the intra-African trade that would have bolstered their regional economies. He confessed a nostalgia for post-colonial attempts at import substitution and autarky in African states, an admiration for Julius Nyerere, and postulated that perhaps the post-pandemic economic decline in the West might foster a reorientation of sub-Saharan trade. Ronan was quick to remind him that attempts to do so by individual states had been rapidly crushed, and that the bodies necessary for a collective response where either nascent or weak.

Alastair noted that we had neglected to consider that increasing ‘isolation’ was also manifested in restrictions on the free movement of people, noting that a world of closed borders and hostility to refugees was frankly dystopian, and was only likely to worsen under the impact of covid.

There was much more, to participate post your comments, join the group or set up your own…